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686 F.Supp.2d 95 
United States District Court, 
District of Columbia. 
Essica BARNABAS, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the UNIVERSITY 
OF the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant. 
Civil Action No. 07–02207 (JDB). 
| 
March 1, 2010. 
Synopsis 
Background: Former University of the District of 
Columbia professor, who was over 65 years old, brought 
action under Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) against university, alleging that university 
discriminated against her on basis of her age and 
retaliated against her after she filed charge of 
discrimination with Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC). University moved for summary 
judgment. 
  
Holdings: The District Court, John D. Bates, J., held that: 
  
[1] Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act did not revive professor’s 
late-filed discrimination claim arising from her 
non-promotion to full-time professor position; 
  
[2] professor failed to show that university’s proffered 
reason for not hiring her to fill vacancies for full-time 
positions was unworthy of credence; 
  
[3] professor’s allegation that university hired younger 
individuals to fill full-time positions was not enough to 
survive summary judgment; 
  
[4] fact issue precluded summary judgment as to retaliation 
claim; and 
  
[5] fact that professor’s schedule was uncharacteristically 
reduced following her protected activity necessarily could 
support inference of mere knowledge on part of university 
of such activity. 
  
Motion for summary judgment granted in part and denied 
in part. 
  
 
 
West Headnotes (19) 
 
 
[1] 
 
Civil Rights 
Age discrimination 
Civil Rights 
Retaliation claims 
 
 District court would consider former university 
employee’s claims for discrimination and 
retaliation under Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) under burden-shifting 
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[2] 
 
Civil Rights 
Age discrimination 
Civil Rights 
Retaliation claims 
 
 Under McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
framework for analyzing claims under Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), a 
plaintiff must first establish prima facie case of 
discrimination or retaliation by preponderance 
of evidence. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[3] 
 
Civil Rights 
Practices prohibited or required in general; 
 elements 
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 To show prima facie case of discrimination 
under Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), a plaintiff must show that (1) she is 
member of a protected class, (2) she suffered 
adverse employment action, and (3) unfavorable 
action gives rise to inference of discrimination. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[4] 
 
Civil Rights 
Practices prohibited or required in general; 
 elements 
 
 Prima facie case of retaliation under Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
requires a plaintiff to establish (1) that he 
engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) that 
he suffered materially adverse action by his 
employer, and (3) that causal link connects the 
two. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[5] 
 
Civil Rights 
Age discrimination 
Civil Rights 
Retaliation claims 
 
 Under McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
framework for analyzing claims under Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
once a plaintiff establishes prima facie case of 
discrimination or retaliation, burden shifts to the 
defendant to articulate legitimate, 
non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory 
explanation for its actions. Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[6] 
 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
 
 In asserting legitimate, non-discriminatory or 
non-retaliatory explanation for an adverse 
employment action, an employer seeking 
summary judgment on Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) claim need not 
persuade district court that it was actually 
motivated by proffered reasons; it is sufficient if 
employer’s evidence raises genuine issue of fact 
as to whether it discriminated against the 
plaintiff. Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et 
seq. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[7] 
 
Civil Rights 
Age discrimination 
Civil Rights 
Retaliation claims 
 
 If an employer offers legitimate, 
non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason for 
its adverse employment actions, district court 
need not, and should not, decide whether the 
plaintiff actually made out prima facie case of 
discrimination or retaliation under Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
under McDonnell Douglas; rather, sole inquiry 
becomes whether employee produced sufficient 
evidence for reasonable jury to find that 
employee on prohibited basis, or, in other 
words, McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
framework essentially disappears and only 
remaining issue is whether employer 
discriminated or retaliated against employee. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
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[8] 
 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
 
 In evaluating whether a plaintiff may overcome 
summary judgment on Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) retaliation claim, 
district court reviews each of three relevant 
categories of evidence, namely, prima facie, 
pretext, and any other, to determine whether 
they either separately or in combination provide 
sufficient evidence for reasonable jury to infer 
retaliation. Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et 
seq. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[9] 
 
Civil Rights 
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
Before Resort to Courts 
 
 An individual who wishes to challenge 
employment practice under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
must first file charge with Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 
7(d)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d)(1). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[10] 
 
Civil Rights 
Deferral to state agencies;  time 
 
 In District of Columbia, where there is local 
anti-discrimination agency, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge must 
be filed within 300 days of occurrence of 
allegedly unlawful practice in order for an 
employee to sustain Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) claim in district 
court. Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967, § 7(d)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d)(1). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[11] 
 
Civil Rights 
Continuing violations;  serial, ongoing, or 
related acts 
 
 Failure of University of the District of Columbia 
to promote adjunct professor, who was over 65 
years old, to full-time professor position was 
not discriminatory compensation decision or 
other practice within meaning of Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act, and thus Act did not revive 
professor’s late-filed discrimination claims 
under Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) arising from her non-promotion. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 
7(d)(1, 3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d)(1, 3). 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[12] 
 
Civil Rights 
Education, employment in 
Civil Rights 
Motive or intent;  pretext 
 
 Former adjunct professor at University of the 
District of Columbia, who was over 65 years 
old, failed to show that discriminatory reason 
likely motivated university’s decision not to hire 
her as full-time professor, or that university’s 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not 
hiring professor for full-time positions, namely, 
that professor did not formally apply for 
positions, was unworthy of credence, in light of 
fact that employee had written multiple letters to 
university expressing her interest in any regular 
full-time professional vacancy, as required to 
sustain discrimination claim under Age 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA); 
there was no evidence that university typically 
considered “standing applications” for 
employment, or that university told professor 
that she need not submit application in order to 
be considered for any available vacancies. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[13] 
 
Civil Rights 
Education, employment in 
 
 Allegation of former adjunct professor at 
University of the District of Columbia that 
university hired younger individuals to fill 
full-time professor positions, without more, was 
not enough to survive summary judgment on her 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) claim based on her non-selection for 
full-time positions. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[14] 
 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
 
 Genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether legitimate, non-retaliatory reason of 
University of the District of Columbia for 
reducing workload of adjunct professor, who 
filed age discrimination complaint Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
complaint, namely, that professor claimed that 
she could not work because of medical 
problems, was pretext for retaliation, precluding 
summary judgment as to professor’s retaliation 
claim against university under Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[15] 
 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
 
 Evidence that university’s non-retaliatory 
explanation for its reduction of courseload of 
adjunct professor, who filed age 
discrimination complaint with Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
was mere pretext could itself allow professor to 
overcome summary judgment on her Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
retaliation claim against university. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[16] 
 
Civil Rights 
Causal connection;  temporal proximity 
 
 Seven-month delay between protected activity 
and an adverse employment action generally 
does not suggest any causal connection between 
the two, as required to sustain Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
retaliation claim. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[17] 
 
Civil Rights 
Causal connection;  temporal proximity 
 
 Especially where a defendant retaliates at first 
opportunity that is presented, a plaintiff will not 
be foreclosed from making out prima facie case 
of retaliation under Age Discrimination in 
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Employment Act (ADEA) despite substantial 
gap in time. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[18] 
 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
 
 Fact that schedule of adjunct professor at 
University of the District of Columbia was 
uncharacteristically reduced following her 
protected activity, which was evidence that 
supported inference of retaliatory motive, 
necessarily could support inference of mere 
knowledge on part of university of such activity, 
as required to survive summary judgment on 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) retaliation claim. Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[19] 
 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Employees and Employment Discrimination, 
Actions Involving 
 
 To survive summary judgment on Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
retaliation claim, a plaintiff need not provide 
direct evidence that his supervisors knew of his 
protected activity; he need only offer 
circumstantial evidence that could reasonably 
support inference that they did. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*98 David Raphael Levinson, Levinson Law Office, 
Washington, DC, for Plaintiff. 
Heather R. Skeeles–Shiner, Zuberi Bakari Williams, 
Office of the Attorney General *99 for the District of 
Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant. 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
JOHN D. BATES, District Judge. 
Plaintiff Essica Barnabas alleges that her former 
employer, the University of the District of Columbia (“the 
University” or “UDC”), discriminated against her on the 
basis of her age and retaliated against her after she filed a 
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Currently before the 
Court is UDC’s motion for summary judgment. For the 
reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and 
deny in part UDC’s motion. 
  
 
BACKGROUND 
Essica Barnabas was born October 10, 1935. Def.’s Mot. 
for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mot.”) [Docket Entry 34], Exhibit 2 
(Deposition of Essica Barnabas (“Barnabas Depo.”)), 
7:20–22. She received her Ph.D in biology from Howard 
University in 1972. See id., Exhibit 7 (Barnabas 
Curriculum Vitae) 3. From 1974 until 2006, Barnabas 
taught in UDC’s Department of Biological and 
Environmental Sciences. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 3. In 
1997, Barnabas was working as an Associate Professor 
when she lost her job as the result of a university-wide 
workforce reduction. See Barnabas Depo. at 25:21–26:7. 
The University immediately rehired Barnabas, but only as 
an adjunct professor teaching on a semester-to-semester 
basis. See id. 35:13–36:6. 
  
Barnabas was eager to return to her previous position as a 
full-time professor. Accordingly, between 2000 and 
2003, Barnabas wrote numerous letters to Dr. Freddie 
Dixon, the chair of UDC’s Biological and Environmental 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 
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Sciences Department, as well as to other UDC 
administrators. In these letters, Barnabas asked that she be 
promoted to a full-time professor, and requested that she 
be appointed to specific teaching vacancies that were 
then, or soon to be, available. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s 
Mot. [Docket Entry 37], Exhibit 2 (letters from Barnabas 
to various UDC officials). She was unsuccessful. 
  
In 2004, a professor vacancy opened in UDC’s 
Biological and Environmental Sciences Department (“the 
Department”). It called for applicants with a “Ph.D in 
Molecular Biology, Biochemistry, Immunology, or 
related areas with post-doctoral training in Cancer or 
Cancer-related research areas.” Def.’s Mot., Exhibit 4 
(Barnabas EEOC packet, Letter from William Penn) 2. 
Barnabas applied for this vacancy, but the University 
instead filled the position with a thirty-three year-old 
man. See Barnabas Depo. at 68:18–70:12; Def.’s Mot., 
Exhibit 5 (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Doc. Request), at 33. 
  
In May 2005, UDC advertised two full-time Assistant 
Professor positions in the Department, each listed under 
vacancy number 04–38. Def.’s Mot., Exhibit 1 (Def.’s 
Answers to Pl.’s Interrog. (“Def.’s Answers”)), No. 
10–11. The Department hired a forty-five year-old woman 
to fill the first position in August 2005, and soon 
withdrew the second position because the department 
lacked funding to fill it. Def.’s Mot., Exhibit 1 (Def.’s 
Supp. Answers to Pl.’s Interrog.), No. 11. Barnabas 
submitted an application for this position in February 
2006, but the second vacancy had already been 
withdrawn. See id. 
  
UDC officials announced another full-time Assistant 
Professor position in the Department in November 2005, 
listed under vacancy number 05–74. Def.’s Answers at 
No. 10. Barnabas did not formally apply for this position, 
Barnabas Depo. at 85:1–17, and the department filled the 
spot with a forty-nine year-old woman in *100 August 
2006. See Def.’s Answers at No. 10; Def.’s Mot., Exhibit 
5 (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Doc. Request), 33. 
  
Between 1997 and 2006, Barnabas taught no fewer than 
two courses per semester as an adjunct professor. See 
Def.’s Mot., Exhibit 3 (Pl.’s Answers to Def.’s Interrog. 
(“Pl.’s Answers”)), No. 5. In the fall semester of 2006, 
however, the University offered Barnabas only one course 
to teach. See Barnabas Depo. at 95:17–20. And in the 
spring semester of 2007 Barnabas was also offered only 
one course. Id. at 96:18–97:2. Barnabas could not teach 
this class, however, because of health concerns with 
commuting in icy weather and the demands of caring for 
her sister. See id. at 97:3–99:12. Barnabas has not taught 
since then because of health problems. See id. at 
104:10–05:5; 107:16–17. 
  
In January 2006, Barnabas filed a complaint with the 
EEOC. In her complaint, she alleged that UDC engaged 
in age discrimination when it failed to select her for the 
2004 vacancy. See Def.’s Mot., Exhibit 4 (Barnabas 
EEOC Packet, Complaint). Barnabas amended her EEOC 
charge in November 2006 to list an additional claim of 
age discrimination, and to allege that UDC reduced her 
workload and compensation in the fall semester of 2006 
in retaliation for her filing an EEOC complaint. Id. 
(Barnabas EEOC Packet, Am. Complaint). After the 
EEOC declined to prosecute her case, Barnabas brought 
suit in this court, alleging violations of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 621–634. UDC has now moved for summary judgment 
on all of Barnabas’s claims. 
  
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and 
the evidence demonstrate that “there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). The 
party seeking summary judgment bears the initial 
responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine 
dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 
The moving party may successfully support its motion by 
identifying those portions of “the pleadings, the discovery 
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits” which 
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2); see also Celotex, 477 
U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. 
  
In determining whether there exists a genuine issue of 
material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment, 
the court must regard the non-movant’s statements as true 
and accept all evidence and make all inferences in the 
non-movant’s favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 
(1986). A non-moving party, however, must establish 
more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” 
in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. By 
pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 
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non-moving party, a moving party may succeed on 
summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 
2548. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not 
significantly probative, summary judgment may be 
granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 
(citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if 
the non-movant fails to offer “evidence on which the jury 
could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Id. at 252, 
106 S.Ct. 2505. 
  
 
DISCUSSION 
I. McDonnell Douglas Framework 
[1] [2] [3] [4] The Court considers Barnabas’s claims for 
discrimination and retaliation *101 under the 
burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 
1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Hall v. Giant Food, 
Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1999) (applying 
McDonnell Douglas to ADEA claims). Under this 
framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination or retaliation by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Id. To show a prima facie case of 
discrimination, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she is a 
member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse 
employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives 
rise to an inference of discrimination.” Stella v. Mineta, 
284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C.Cir.2002) (citing Brown v. Brody, 
199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C.Cir.1999)). A prima facie case of 
retaliation, similarly, requires a plaintiff to establish “(1) 
that he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that 
he suffered a materially adverse action by his employer; 
and (3) that a causal link connects the two.” Wiley v. 
Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C.Cir.2007). 
  
[5] [6] Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory or - retaliatory explanation for its 
actions. See Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 455 
(D.C.Cir.2005). In asserting a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory or -retaliatory explanation, an 
employer “need not persuade the court that it was actually 
motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the 
defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.” Tex. Dep’t 
of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255, 101 S.Ct. 
1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (citation omitted). 
  
[7] [8] If a defendant offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
or - retaliatory reason for its actions, “the district court 
need not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff 
actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell 
Douglas.” Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 
490, 494 (D.C.Cir.2008). Rather, the sole inquiry 
becomes “whether the plaintiff produced sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s 
asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual 
reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff on a prohibited basis.” Adeyemi v. 
Dist. of Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222, 1226 (D.C.Cir.2008). 
In other words, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
framework essentially disappears and the only remaining 
issue is whether the employer discriminated or retaliated 
against the employee. See Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 
670, 678 (D.C.Cir.2009) (applying this approach to 
ADEA claims). In evaluating whether the plaintiff may 
overcome summary judgment, “the court reviews each of 
the three relevant categories of evidence—prima facie, 
pretext, and any other—to determine whether they ‘either 
separately or in combination’ provide sufficient evidence 
for a reasonable jury to infer retaliation.” Id. at 679 
(quoting Waterhouse v. Dist. of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 
996 (D.C.Cir.2002)). 
  
 
II. Age Discrimination Claims 
Barnabas alleges that UDC discriminated against her by 
failing to select her for any of three full-time positions.1 
The Court takes each in turn. 
  
 
*102 A. 2004 Vacancy2 
Barnabas alleges that UDC discriminated against her 
when it filled the full-time position she applied for in 
2004 with a much younger individual. UDC responds that 
this claim should be dismissed because Barnabas failed to 
file a timely complaint with the EEOC. See Pl.’s Mot. at 
14–15. 
  
[9] [10] “An individual who wishes to challenge an 
employment practice under the ADEA must first file a 
charge with the EEOC.” Faison v. Dist. Columbia, 664 
F.Supp.2d 59, 64 (D.D.C.2009); see 29 U.S.C. § 
626(d)(1). “In the District of Columbia, where there is a 
local anti-discrimination agency, this charge must be filed 
within 300 days of the occurrence of the allegedly 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 
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unlawful practice.” Faison, 664 F.Supp.2d at 64. 
  
Barnabas concedes that she failed to adhere to these 
statutory requirements for her allegation concerning the 
2004 vacancy: her EEOC complaint was filed well over 
300 days after she was denied the position. See Def.’s 
Opp’n at 4. Instead, she contends that the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub.L. No. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5 
(2009), revives her claim. The Lilly Ledbetter Act, as 
incorporated into the ADEA, states that “an unlawful 
practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in 
compensation in violation of [the ADEA], when a 
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is 
adopted, when a person becomes subject to a 
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or 
when a person is affected by application of a 
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice.” 
29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(3). According to Barnabas, the 
University’s decision not to grant her the 2004 position 
was a “discriminatory compensation decision or other 
practice” that still affected her salary at the time she filed 
her 2006 EEOC complaint. See Def.’s Opp’n at 4–5. 
Thus, she argues, her EEOC charge was timely filed. 
  
Barnabas’s argument is foreclosed by the D.C. Circuit’s 
recent decision in Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
LLP, 595 F.3d 370 (D.C.Cir.2010). In that case, the 
plaintiff argued that his employer’s failure to promote him 
was a discriminatory compensation decision or other 
practice under the Lilly Ledbetter Act. According to him, 
because his salary still suffered from the continued effects 
of his employer’s failure to promote him, the Act 
rendered timely his otherwise late-filed discrimination 
claims. The D.C. Circuit rejected this contention, holding 
that “the decision whether to promote an employee to a 
higher paying position is not a ‘compensation decision or 
other practice’ within the meaning of that phrase in the” 
Lilly Ledbetter Act. Id. at 375. The Lilly Ledbetter Act 
therefore “d[id] not revive [plaintiff’s] claims under the 
ADEA.” Id. 
  
[11] Hence, UDC’s failure to promote Barnabas to a 
full-time professor position was not a discriminatory 
compensation decision or other practice. The Lilly 
Ledbetter Act does not revive Barnabas’s late-filed 
allegations concerning the 2004 vacancy, and she has thus 
failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies with 
respect to this allegation.3 
  
 
B. Vacancy 04–38 
[12] Barnabas next alleges that UDC unlawfully failed to 
hire her as an Assistant *103 Professor for vacancy 
number 04–38. UDC offers a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory explanation for its decision: Barnabas 
did not formally apply for this vacancy until February 
2006, months after the University had already filled the 
position. See Def.’s Answers at No. 11.4 Therefore, “the 
only question is whether the employee’s evidence creates 
a material dispute on the ultimate issue of [discrimination] 
‘either directly by [showing] that a discriminatory reason 
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by 
showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is 
unworthy of credence.’ ” Jones, 557 F.3d at 678 (quoting 
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 
460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 
(1983)) (second alteration in original). 
  
Barnabas concedes that she did not formally apply for the 
04–38 vacancy until months after UDC filled the position. 
She argues, however, that when this position was posted 
she had “multiple outstanding applications pending with 
[UDC] for any regular full time professorial vacancy.” 
Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. She points to eleven letters she wrote to 
various UDC officials between 2000 and 2003. See id., 
Exhibit 2. In these letters, Barnabas expressed her strong 
desire to be reappointed to a full-time position, and 
requested that she be awarded specific teaching vacancies. 
See id. 
  
These letters—written before vacancy number 04–38 was 
posted—may indicate that Barnabas wished to be 
appointed to any available full-time position. But nothing 
in the record discredits UDC’s claim that it did not 
consider Barnabas for the vacancy because she never 
formally applied for it. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 496; 
Fischbach v. Dist. of Columbia Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 
1180, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“Once the employer has 
articulated a non-discriminatory explanation for its action 
... the issue is not the correctness or desirability of the 
reasons offered but whether the employer honestly 
believes in the reasons it offers.” (internal quotation 
marks and alterations omitted)). There is no evidence that 
the University typically considers “standing applications” 
for employment, or that UDC told Barnabas that she need 
not submit an application in order to be considered for 
any available professor vacancies. Indeed, UDC’s 
evidence—irrefuted on this point—indicates that only 
individuals who formally applied were considered for this 
position. See Def.’s Answers at No. 11 (“The Plaintiff’s 
resume and application had not been received by the 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8 
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Office of Human Resources and therefore was not 
submitted for the first screening.”); id. at No. 14 (“The 
Plaintiff was ineligible to be considered at the time of 
[the] appointment because she had not submitted her 
application for consideration at that time.”). Thus, nothing 
suggests that the University’s explanation for its decision 
not to hire Barnabas is false. 
  
[13] Moreover, Barnabas has failed to identify evidence to 
support her allegations of discriminatory intent. She has 
not argued, for example, that she was more qualified than 
the individual hired for this vacancy—herself forty-five 
years-old. Nor has she suggested that UDC only 
interviewed young applicants for the position. Indeed, at 
her deposition Barnabas denied having “any interactions 
with anyone at UDC that made [her] feel that [she was] 
being discriminated against based on [her] age.” Barnabas 
Depo. at 115:8–22. Thus, Barnabas’s charge of 
discrimination rests *104 only on the fact that UDC hired 
a younger individual to fill the position. Without more, 
this is not enough to survive summary judgment. See 
Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 767 
(D.C.Cir.2002) (“[Defendants’] decision to replace 
[plaintiff] with a younger woman is insufficient for a jury 
to conclude that she ‘lost out because of [her] age ....’ 
[Plaintiff] proffered no other evidence that she was 
terminated because of her age ....” (citations omitted) 
(quoting O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 
U.S. 308, 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996))).5 
  
 
C. Vacancy 05–74 
Finally, Barnabas suggests that UDC unlawfully failed to 
hire her as an Assistant Professor for vacancy number 
05–74. UDC offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
explanation for this decision as well: Barnabas never 
applied for the position. See Barnabas Depo. at 85:1–17.6 
Accordingly, the Court turns to the “only question” 
remaining: “whether the employee’s evidence creates a 
material dispute on the ultimate issue of [discrimination].” 
Jones, 557 F.3d at 678. 
  
As with vacancy number 04–38, Barnabas’s argument 
rests on the assumption that she had a standing 
employment application pending when this position was 
listed. But once again, the record lacks any evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could conclude that UDC 
discriminated against Barnabas by not awarding her this 
position. There is no evidence that the University did not 
honestly and reasonably believe that it was Barnabas’s 
failure to apply for this job that removed her from 
consideration. See Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183. And there 
is nothing—save only for the fact that a younger 
individual was hired—to suggest that discrimination 
motivated the University’s decision. Without more, 
Barnabas’s claim cannot survive summary judgment. See 
Dunaway, 310 F.3d at 767. 
  
In sum, no reasonable jury could conclude that UDC 
intentionally discriminated against Barnabas on the basis 
of her age. The Court will thus grant UDC summary 
judgment as to all of Barnabas’s allegations of age 
discrimination.7 
  
 
III. Retaliation Claim 
[14] Barnabas has also alleged that UDC retaliated against 
her by reducing her teaching load for the fall semester of 
2006 after she filed a discrimination complaint with the 
EEOC in January 2006. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 19. 
UDC offers a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for 
its decision to reduce her teaching load—namely, that 
Barnabas’s “schedule was not reduced until she reported 
that she was unable to work because of medical 
problems.” Def.’s Answers to Pl.’s Interrog. at No. 15.8 
Thus, the question once again becomes “whether the 
employee’s *105 evidence creates a material dispute on 
the ultimate issue of retaliation.” Jones, 557 F.3d at 678. 
In analyzing this issue, the Court considers “each of the 
three relevant categories of evidence—prima facie, 
pretext, and any other—to determine whether they ‘either 
separately or in combination’ provide sufficient evidence 
for a reasonable jury to infer retaliation.” Id. at 679 
(quoting Waterhouse, 298 F.3d at 996). 
  
Here, Barnabas has provided evidence that UDC’s 
explanation for its decision to reduce her schedule is false. 
UDC contends that Barnabas’s schedule was only reduced 
after she claimed to the University that she could not 
work. But UDC does not identify any instance where 
Barnabas “reported that she was unable to work because 
of medical problems” before the fall 2006 semester. And 
Barnabas stated at her deposition that it was in January 
2007—months after her teaching load was reduced—that 
she first informed her department chair that she would 
have trouble commuting in the icy weather conditions, in 
part due to health concerns. Barnabas Depo. at 97:3–99:9. 
Taken in the light most favorable to Barnabas, then, the 
evidence directly contradicts UDC’s non-retaliatory 
explanation for its reduction of Barnabas’s schedule, and 
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a reasonable jury could infer that the University’s 
explanation is mere pretext. 
  
[15] Evidence that UDC’s non-retaliatory explanation for 
its actions is mere pretext may itself allow Barnabas to 
overcome summary judgment. See Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 
L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (trier of fact may “infer the ultimate 
fact of [retaliation] from the falsity of the employer’s 
explanation”); Jones, 557 F.3d at 679 (“[T]hough 
evidence of pretext is not per se sufficient to permit an 
inference of [retaliation], it [u]sually ... will be enough to 
get a plaintiff’s claim to a jury.” (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted)). Here, though, there is further 
evidence of a temporal proximity between Barnabas’s 
filing of an EEOC complaint and the University’s 
decision to reduce her teaching load. 
  
[16] [17] [18] [19] Barnabas filed her EEOC complaint in late 
January 2006, and the University reduced her teaching 
load in August of that year.9 Generally, an approximately 
seven-month delay between protected activity and an 
adverse employment action does not suggest any causal 
connection between the two. See Buggs v. Powell, 293 
F.Supp.2d 135, 149 (D.D.C.2003) (seven-month gap “is 
not, by itself, sufficient to establish an inference of 
discrimination”). But “[e]specially where a defendant 
retaliates at the first opportunity that is presented, a 
plaintiff will not be foreclosed from making out a prima 
facie case despite a substantial gap in time.” 
Pardo–Kronemann v. Jackson, 541 F.Supp.2d 210, 218 
(D.D.C.2008). Here, the University has not disputed 
Barnabas’s assertion that fall 2006 was the first 
opportunity for it to reduce her teaching load following 
her protected activity. And this reduction in Barnabas’s 
schedule is conspicuous: *106 she had taught at least two 
courses in every semester from 1997 until fall 2006. See 
Pl.’s Answers at No. 5.10 A reasonable jury could infer 
that this sudden change in a previously-consistent 
schedule, issued at the first opportunity the University had 
to reduce Barnabas’s teaching load after she filed an 
EEOC complaint, was the result of retaliation.11 
  
Because Barnabas has provided evidence that UDC’s 
non-retaliatory explanation for its decision to reduce her 
schedule was false, and because a temporal proximity 
exists between Barnabas’s protected activity and the 
University’s adverse employment action, a reasonable 
jury could find that the University reduced Barnabas’s 
teaching load in retaliation for her filing an EEOC 
complaint. Accordingly, the Court will deny summary 
judgment on Barnabas’s fall 2006 retaliation claim.12 
  
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part and 
deny in part UDC’s motion for summary judgment. A 
separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 
  
All Citations 
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Footnotes 
 
1 
 
Barnabas also suggests that UDC discriminated against her by failing to hire her for other full-time positions. See Pl.’s 
Opp’n at 4. She has offered no evidence or argument as to those other allegedly discriminatory acts, however. 
 
2 
 
The record does not identify the vacancy number for this position. 
 
3 
 
In light of this conclusion that Barnabas’s claims were not timely filed with the EEOC, the Court need not address 
UDC’s argument that Barnabas was not qualified for the position. 
 
4 
 
UDC initially sought to hire two professors for this vacancy, but ultimately withdrew the funding for the second 
position. Id. Barnabas does not contend that UDC’s decision not to hire a second professor for this vacancy was 
discriminatory. 
 
5 
 
Because it concludes that Barnabas has not shown any evidence of discrimination, the Court need not address UDC’s 
argument, made for the first time in its reply brief, that Barnabas failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies 
with respect to this vacancy. See Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of its Mot. [Docket Entry 38] (“Pl.’s Reply”) at 3. 
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6 
 
In its reply brief, UDC states that Barnabas did in fact apply for vacancy number 05–74. See Pl.’s Reply at 4 n. 2. This 
appears to be in error, as Barnabas herself concedes that she did not apply for the position. See Barnabas Depo. at 
85:1–17. 
 
7 
 
Barnabas’s complaint alleges that UDC’s “policy and practice in defining and in filling regular full time professor 
vacancies in its Department of Biological and Environmental Sciences is based upon age.” Amend. Compl. ¶ 16. There 
is nothing in the record to support this allegation, and in any event Barnabas appears to have abandoned it. 
 
8 
 
UDC also asserts in its motion for summary judgment that Barnabas’s reduced teaching load was “a function of the 
University’s limited need for her to teach during that time period.” Def.’s Mot. at 23. This explanation, offered without 
citation, cannot supply an additional non-retaliatory explanation, as the record lacks any evidence of the University’s 
teaching needs. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (“An articulation not admitted into evidence will not 
suffice. Thus, the defendant cannot meet its burden [to provide a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation] merely 
through an answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel.”). 
 
9 
 
The record is silent as to when UDC decided to reduce Barnabas’s teaching load. Accordingly, the Court assumes that 
August 2006—the start of the fall semester, see Barnabas Depo. 103:8–9—is the relevant date for this inquiry. 
 
10 
 
UDC claims that there is no evidence that individuals with control over Barnabas’s schedule were even aware of her 
protected activity. See Def.’s Mot. at 22; see also Jones, 557 F.3d at 679 (“We agree that Jones’s supervisors could 
not have retaliated against him unless they had knowledge of his protected activity.”). But to survive summary 
judgment, a plaintiff “needn’t provide direct evidence that his supervisors knew of his protected activity; he need only 
offer circumstantial evidence that could reasonably support an inference that they did.” Jones, 557 F.3d at 679. Here, 
UDC has offered no evidence that her supervisors did not know of plaintiff’s protected activity. And the fact that 
Barnabas’s schedule was uncharacteristically reduced following her protected activity—evidence that supports an 
inference of retaliatory motive—“necessarily can support an inference of mere knowledge.” See id. 
 
11 
 
In a response to one of UDC’s interrogatories, Barnabas states that “[Department Chair Dr. Freddie] Dixon’s 
relationship with Barnabas changed from supportive to hostile ... in particular after Barnabas raised, through her 
attorney, claims of age discrimination in 2005, and filed EEOC charges in January 2006. Dixon then avoided direct 
communication with Barnabas and channeled communications with Barnabas through Dixon’s secretary.” Pl.’s 
Answers at No. 3. In her deposition taken less than a week later, however, Barnabas stated that these changes in her 
relationship with Dixon took place in 2002. See Barnabas Depo. at 111:19–14:13. And Barnabas further clarified that 
Dixon never told her that all communications with her needed to go through Dixon’s secretary. Barnabas Depo. at 
113:14–17. In light of these contradictions, which the parties do not address, in resolving this motion the Court has not 
considered Barnabas’s suggestion in her interrogatory response that Dixon’s attitude towards her changed after she 
filed her EEOC complaint. 
 
12 
 
The Court will also deny summary judgment on Barnabas’s claim that UDC retaliated against her by assigning her only 
one course in spring 2007. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7. UDC contends that Barnabas failed to bring this allegation before the 
EEOC, see Def.’s Mot. at 14, 23, but this alleged retaliation is merely a continuation of the alleged unlawful behavior 
Barnabas identified in her amended EEOC complaint. Given the Court’s conclusion that the University’s reduction of 
Barnabas’s courseload in fall 2006 may have been retaliatory, it cannot conclude as a matter of law that the continued 
reduction in her courseload the following semester was not also unlawful. The Court does, however, grant summary 
judgment as to any claim that the University retaliated against Barnabas by not awarding her any courses to teach in 
summer 2007. See Amend. Compl. ¶ 12. Barnabas concedes that in summer 2007 “her disabilities developed so as to 
prevent her from seeking or accepting any further work.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 7; see also Barnabas Depo. at 104:10–105:5. 
 
 
 
 
End of Document 
 
© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
 
 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11 
 
11
et al.: Panel: Age Discrimination Issues in Higher Education - Handout: B
Published by The Keep, 2017
Herbert, William 3/10/2017 
For Educational Use Only 
Barnabas v. Board of Trustees of University of District of..., 686 F.Supp.2d 95 (2010)  
255 Ed. Law Rep. 795 
 
 
 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12 
 
12
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 12 [2017], Art. 51
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/51
